# 17. Tracking and Trust on the Web




Blase Ur and David Cash February 19<sup>th</sup>, 2021 CMSC 23200 / 33250



#### Online Tracking

 Advertisers want to show you advertisements targeted to your interests and demographics



#### Online Tracking

- First party = the site you are visiting (whose address is in the URL bar)
- Third party = other sites contacted as a result of your visit to that site
- First-party tracking (e.g., for search)
  - Consider DuckDuckGo and alternatives

#### **Data-Driven Inferences**



Here Are the Most Dog-Friendly Restaurants in the United States









KELLI BENDER









You might like dogs!

## **Targeted Advertising**






# Targeted Advertising



# Targeted Advertising




#### Mechanics of Tracking


- Canonically, tracking is accomplished via HTTP cookies
  - Third-party cookies


#### Online Tracking


- JavaScript / images from advertising networks loaded as part of your page
  - In iframes
  - Or sometimes not
  - Why does this matter?
  - Does this also apply to email? (Yes)

#### Ubiquity of Online Tracking












1) Categories keywords extraction







#### Ad Bidding Marketplaces




#### **Existing Privacy Tools**






## **Existing Privacy Tools**





#### Do not track

- Proposed W3C standard
- User checks a box
- Browser sends "do not track" header to website
- Website stops "tracking"
- W3C working group trying to define what that means





#### Tools to stop tracking, effective?

- Browser privacy settings
  - Cookie blocking
  - P3P
  - Tracking Protection Lists
  - Do Not Track
- Browser add-ons
- Opt-out cookies
- Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) AdChoices icon and associated opt-out pages



#### Visualization: Connection Graphs






#### Browser fingerprinting

- Use features of the browser that are relatively unique to your machine
  - Fonts
  - GPU model anti-aliasing (Canvas fingerprinting)
  - User-agent string
  - (Often not) IP address (Why not?)


#### Device Fingerprinting

- Use unique(-ish) combination of device features as an identifier
- https://panopticlick.eff.org/



#### **Location Tracking**

- IP Geolocation
  - Hierarchy of IP addresses
- GPS (Global Positioning System)
  - ~31 satellites in semi-synchronous orbit in OUTER SPACE with atomic clocks
  - Always ~6 satellites in line of sight
  - Multilateration



#### What Does HTTPS Hide? (Ghost)

- Body of the HTTP request / response is hidden
- ...So what's left to be seen / inferred?

#### Side Channels

 Using metadata or outside observations to make inferences about the data





#### Web Side Channels Include:

- Size of packets
  - How can this reveal what pages you are visiting?
- Timing

#### **Remote Timing Attacks are Practical**

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#### Abstract

Timing attacks are usually used to attack weak computing devices such as smartcards. We show that timing attacks apply to general software systems. Specifically, we devise a timing attack against OpenSSL. Our experiments show that we can extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network. Our results demonstrate that timing attacks against network servers are practical and therefore

The attacking machine and the server were in different buildings with three routers and multiple switches between them. With this setup we were able to extract the SSL private key from common SSL applications such as a web server (Apache+mod\_SSL) and a SSL-tunnel.

Interprocess. We successfully mounted the attack between two processes running on the same machine. A hosting center that hosts two domains on the same machine might give management access to the admins of each domain. Since both domain are

#### Web Side Channels Include:

- Color
  - link one
  - second link
  - link three (visited)
  - fourth link