10. Privacy on the Web



Blase Ur and David Cash February 3rd, 2020 CMSC 23200 / 33250



Online Tracking


 Advertisers want to show you advertisements targeted to your interests and demographics Ads Preferences

. Ads on Search and

. Ads on the web

Gmail

Opt out



Ads on the web

Make the ads you see on the web more interesting

Many websites, such as news sites and blogs, partner with us to show ads to their visitors. To see ads that are more related to you and your interests, edit the categories below, which are based on sites you have recently visited. Learn More

Your interests are associated with an advertising cookie that's stored in your browser. If you don't want us to store your interests, you can opt out below. Your ads preferences only apply in this browser on this computer. They are reset if you delete your browser's cookies.

· Watch a video: Ads Preferences on GDN explained

Your categories

Below you can review the interests and inferred demographics that Google has associated with your cookie. You can remove or edit these at any time.

Arts & Entertainment

Computers & Electronics

Computers & Electronics - Consumer Electronics - Gadgets & Portable Electronics - PDAs & Handhelds

Internet & Telecom

Internet & Telecom - Mobile & Wireless - Mobile Phones - Smart Phones

Law & Government

Science

Your demographics

We infer your age and gender based on the websites you've visited. You can remove or edit these at any time.

Age: 35-44

Gender: Male


Online Tracking

- First party = the site you are visiting (whose address is in the URL bar)
- Third party = other sites contacted as a result of your visit to that site
- First-party tracking (e.g., for search)
 - Consider DuckDuckGo and alternatives


Online Tracking

- JavaScript / images from advertising networks loaded as part of your page
 - In iframes
 - Or sometimes not
 - Why does this matter?
 - Does this also apply to email? (Yes)

Ubiquity of Online Tracking




Ad Bidding Marketplaces



Do not track

- Proposed W3C standard
- User checks a box
- Browser sends "do not track" header to website
- Website stops "tracking"
- W3C working group trying to define what that means





Tools to stop tracking, effective?

- Browser privacy settings
 - Cookie blocking
 - P3P
 - Tracking Protection Lists
 - Do Not Track
- Browser add-ons
- Opt-out cookies
- Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) AdChoices icon and associated opt-out pages




Existing Privacy Tools







Existing Privacy Tools





Connection Graphs






Browser fingerprinting

- Use features of the browser that are relatively unique to your machine
 - Fonts
 - GPU model anti-aliasing (Canvas fingerprinting)
 - User-agent string
 - (Often not) IP address (Why not?)


Device Fingerprinting

- Use unique(-ish) combination of device features as an identifier
- https://panopticlick.eff.org/



Location Tracking

- IP Geolocation
 - Hierarchy of IP addresses
- GPS (Global Positioning System)
 - ~31 satellites in semi-synchronous orbit in OUTER SPACE with atomic clocks
 - Always ~6 satellites in line of sight
 - Multilateration



What Does HTTPS Hide? (GCSSP)

- Body of the HTTP request / response is hidden
- ...So what's left to be seen / inferred?

Side Channels

 Using metadata or outside observations to make inferences about the data





Web Side Channels Include:

- Size of packets
 - How can this reveal what pages you are visiting?
- Timing

Remote Timing Attacks are Practical

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Abstract

Timing attacks are usually used to attack weak computing devices such as smartcards. We show that timing attacks apply to general software systems. Specifically, we devise a timing attack against OpenSSL. Our experiments show that we can extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network. Our results demonstrate that timing attacks against network servers are practical and therefore

The attacking machine and the server were in different buildings with three routers and multiple switches between them. With this setup we were able to extract the SSL private key from common SSL applications such as a web server (Apache+mod_SSL) and a SSL-tunnel.

Interprocess. We successfully mounted the attack between two processes running on the same machine. A hosting center that hosts two domains on the same machine might give management access to the admins of each domain. Since both domain are

Web Side Channels Include:

- Color
 - link one
 - second link
 - link three (visited)
 - fourth link